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1.   Background 
The restructuring of domestic support to agriculture in many nations, while being 
in accordance to recent changes in WTO rules, has slowed trade liberalization and has 
made uncertain the success of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) (Chuanmin and 
Guoqianq, 2007). Given the potential failure of the DDA for multilateral trade 
negotiations, Canada will likely turn more to strengthening bilateral and regional trade 
agreements (RTAs). Bilateral agreements and RTAs between the U.S. and other countries 
have been growing rapidly in recent years (Josling, 2007), partly because of the failures 
in the multilateral trade agreements. The successes of these agreements have been linked 
to the small number of countries and stakeholders involved in teh negotiations and the 
subsequent ease in complying with national policies and institutions (Volltrath, 2003). 
Such experiences suggest that bilateral agreements and RTAs with the U.S. and other 
countries provide the greatest potential in meeting the future trade interests of Canadian 
producers. 
While bilateral free trade agreements such as CUSTA/NAFTA have made 
significant improvements in Canadian-U.S. agricultural trade, substantial tariff and non-
tariff trade barriers still exist (Furtan and van Melle, 2004). In particular, recent changes 
in traceability and labelling requirements, and sanitary and phytosanitary regulations 
have created major barriers to trade (Vollrath, 2003). The recent BSE disease outbreak in 
Canada and the 9/11 terrorist attack in the U.S. highlight the increased focus paid to food 
health and safety issues, terrorism, and their relationship to agricultural trade. For some 
agricultural imports, the U.S. Bioterrorism Act (BTA) includes technical and quality 
standards, administrative standards such as food traceability, and requirements on   2
packaging and labelling (Wieck et al., 2005). These recent events are partly responsible 
for increasing demands by the U.S. for country of origin labelling and increased health 
and safety testing on food and other raw materials entering the country.  
The recent changes in U.S. policy suggest that exports of Canadian agricultural 
products to the U.S. are threatened despite strong trade relations between the two 
countries. In general, it is important that access to U.S. market be maintained, since 
market access enhances economic opportunities for Canadian producers. It can appear, 
then, that the preservation of the U.S. market is always in the interests of Canada. This 
assumption is supported in part by the economic gains for Canadian producers through 
free trade agreements.  It is generally accepted by economists that free trade within North 
America has improved productivity and increased growth in the Canadian agricultural 
sector  (Vollrath and Hallahan, 2006; Sparling and Caswell, 2006; Vollrath, 2003).  In 
this context, it appears acceptable to incur some added costs resulting from technical 
trade barriers, such as requirements on packaging and labelling. 
In some instances incurring added production costs may not be justified, 
especially if the requirements of the international market will raise the cost of domestic or 
inter-provincial trade. For Canada, the added cost to domestic trade is an important 
consideration. Recent trade data show that the value of domestic agricultural exports in 
Canada is greater than the value of international agriculture exports, averaging $24.4 
billion and $22.9 billion respectively, from 1997 to 2003 (Statistics Canada, 2007a). 
Furthermore, domestic agricultural trade is responsible for approximately 12% of total 
domestic export value, while agriculture’s share of international export value is only 6%   3
(Statistics Canada, 2007a). These findings suggest that for Canadian agriculture domestic 
trade is equally and perhaps more important than international trade.  
Because of the need to consider domestic trade issues in Canada, new trade 
agreements require analysis designed to measure the costs and benefits associated with 
compliance to foreign trade requirements. For U.S.-Canadian trade, analysis is needed 
that compares the economic consequences of compliance to trade restrictions and the 
non-compliance cases that would result in the loss of the U.S. market. While it is clear 
that maintaining free market access without technical barriers maximizes the net returns 
in the system, it may not be the case for all agricultural commodities, especially in cases 
where maintenance of trade comes with increased costs. The economic problem is thus a 
choice between two scenarios: to comply with U.S. requirements or abandon the U.S. 
market. At a national level, either choice will have implications on the distribution of 
economic and farming activities, growth within the agricultural sector, and the viability 
of agricultural enterprises. 
The potential for import barriers on Canadian seed potatoes provides an empirical 
example that highlights the domestic verses international trade issue.  The Canadian seed 
potato market has come under increasing scrutiny by the U.S. and is an example of an 
industry facing additional restrictions to maintain access to the U.S. market. This 
increased focus results from three disease outbreaks in the last twenty years: 1) the Potato 
Virus Y  Necrosis  (PVYn) outbreak in Prince Edward Island (PEI) between 1989-92; the 
potato wart outbreak in PEI in 2000; and 3) the golden nematode outbreak in Quebec in 
2006.  All of these disease outbreaks resulted in a temporary ban on seed product entering 
the U.S. and a strengthening of import requirements for seed potatoes after the bans were   4
lifted.  These import requirements were relaxed when the disease outbreaks were 
contained, but the U.S. seems to be leaning towards making them permanent (e.g. 
Parliament of Canada, 2001). These increased requirements include: 1) province of origin 
labelling (POOL) that will require more costly tracing systems than those currently in 
place; and 2) a ban on bulk shipments with a maximum package weight of fifty pounds 
(e.g. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2004). 
  The increased costs of compliance with the U.S. requirements will impose 
additional tracing and packaging (T&P) costs on seed potato producers in Canada, which 
will not only affect bilateral trade with the U.S. but also domestic trade within Canada. 
Because effective traceability systems must be in place for the sale of seed potatoes to all 
buyers, additional requirements will result in more T&P costs for all seed producers in 
Canada. Therefore, it is not clear if the preservation of the U.S. market for seed potatoes 
is worth the increased cost to domestic trade within Canada. The purpose of this study is 
to assess these issues for the Canadian seed potato market. The objectives are to: (1) 
determine if the preservation of the U.S. market for seed potatoes is worth the increased 
cost of trading within Canada; (2) determine to what extent seed potato trade between 
Canada and the rest of world will offset the loss of the U.S. market; and (3) measure 
distributional effects for seed production within Canada arising from T&P costs and the 
loss of the U.S. market.  
 
2.   Model 
  The market impacts of increased T&P costs on the Canadian seed potato industry 
are estimated using a single commodity, partial equilibrium trade model for the North   5
American seed potato market. The partial equilibrium model is of the type pioneered by 
Samuelson (1952), and further developed by Takayama and Judge (1964) into a quadratic 
programming problem where the objective is to maximize the sum of all regions social 
welfare (W). Given linear supply and demand relationships with intercept terms α
s and α
d, 
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where zij is the quantity supplied from region i to region j, and 
m
ij Q  is the quantity 
exported from region i to international market j. 
For this study, the model consists of three Canadian regions; Atlantic (Nova 
Scotia, New Brunswick and PEI), Central (Quebec and Ontario), and Western (Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia). Seed potatoes in any region can be sold on 
the local market, to other domestic markets, to the U.S., or to the rest of the world 
(ROW). Import demand functions for the U.S. and ROW markets, and supply and 
demand relationships for each Canadian region, are calculated from elasticity estimates, 
(see Appendix A for details on elasticity estimation). 
 
3.   Data and Methods 
The data used to estimate the demand and supply relationships, and to validate the 
model come from Statistics Canada and Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC).  
Demand for seed potatoes for each Canadian region was derived from total certified seed 
acreage multiplied by an average seeding rate of 25 cwt/acre. Total certified seed acreage 
data is available from the AAFC online database InfoHort (AAFC, 2007). Domestic trade 
data for Canada are available from the Potato Market Review (AAFC, various years). 
Total potato acreage by province, and price indices used to estimate supply and demand 
elasticities are available from CANSIM (Statistics Canada, 2007b).   T&P costs were 
estimated using studies on traceability costs for grain
 and fresh produce, adjusted for   7
potato production and packaging costs (e.g. Fonsah, 2006; and Wilson et al. 2005). 
Quantity and price data used to calibrate the model are given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Average price and quantity data used to calibrate seed potato trade 
model  
1997-2001 Average   Atlantic Canada Central Canada Western Canada
Market Price ($CAD/cwt) 
Local  10.88 11.18 13.02 
U.S  export  12.43 16.51 16.29 
ROW  export  28.78 17.48 27.17 
     
Quantity Seed Potatoes (cwt)       
Local demand   3,324,028.6  2,064,254.9  2,750,863.2 
      Local supply  5,903,262.6  1,153,755.6  5,746,853.2 
U.S. exports  897,297.2  18,342.2  1,822,663.1 
ROW exports  357,482.4  3201.1  43,011.5 




  An important consideration in modelling seed potato trade is the quality 
differences for seed potatoes grown in different regions and the accurate simulation of 
trade flows. The data revealed that trade in seed potatoes existed even though the average 
price difference between regions was less than the approximate transportation cost.  This 
suggests that quality differences exist between seed sold locally and the seed exported to 
other regions. Positive mathematical programming (Howitt, 1995) was used to calibrate 
both domestic and international trade flows to account for quality differences. Constraints 
were added to the model to force the international exports to the average amount for crop 
years 1997 to 2001. Domestic flows were constrained to the average across only crop 
years 1997 and 1998, since domestic trade data is not available past 1999. Transportation 
costs were adjusted by the shadow values of the trade flow constraints. This process can   8
approximate the premiums paid for seed potatoes and correct remaining errors made in 
approximating true transportation costs.  
  Increased T&P costs are included in the model through a shift in Canadian supply 
curves.  To be effective, traceability systems must be in place for the sale of seed potatoes 
to local, domestic and international buyers and sellers.  Therefore, additional traceability 
requirements will result in more costly T&P systems for all producers in Canada, not just 
those producing seed potatoes in any particular Province. Shifting the domestic supply 
curves reflects the added costs of traceability systems which will be incurred on all 
transactions of seed potatoes.  Two increased T&P costs are analyzed: 1) a low cost 
estimate of $0.04/cwt; and 2) a high cost estimate of $0.76/cwt. From 2000 to 2006 the 
average price received for seed potatoes in Canada was approximately $12.00/cwt 
(Statistics Canada, 2007b). The two traceability systems therefore account for 
approximately 0.7% and 6.3% of the average market price, respectively.  
The low tracing cost estimate of $0.04/cwt accounts for a rubber stamp that would 
need to be added to the package that identifies the Province of origin. Under this 
estimate, the one-step forward, one-step back paper tracing system currently in place 
would be maintained. The high cost estimate of $0.76/cwt includes the increased 
packaging cost plus the implementation of a bar code tracing system (e.g. EAN.UCC, 
2003). Estimates of the costs of implementing this system are provided by Wilson et al. 
(2005). This system requires producers to implement an electronically based tracing 
system with additional scanning equipment and software.  Excluded from this estimate is 
the radio frequency identification (RFID) tracing technology, which would add an 
additional $4.00/cwt to the T&P costs (Pape et al., 2003).   9
Of the two estimates, the high cost estimate seems most plausible.  The one-step 
forward one-step back paper based system has been questioned as a system that does not 
respond quickly to disease outbreaks.  In contrast, the bar code method is becoming the 
new standard for tracing systems. 
 
4.   Results  
  Tables 2 and 3 present the simulation results of the seed potato trade model. Three 
T&P cost estimates are examined; i) the low cost estimate of $0.04/cwt (column 2); ii) 
the high cost estimate of $0.76/cwt (column 4), and iii) an estimate of the traceability cost 
that would result in the same loss to the domestic market as a ban on U.S. seed potato 
trade (column 3). Column 3 is an estimate of the maximum Canadian seed potato 
producers and consumers would be willing to pay to preserve the U.S. seed potato 
market, assuming the distribution of benefits and costs among Canadian seed potato 
producers and consumers does not matter in such considerations. These results are 




  Table 2 gives the market price and quantity impacts from the various trade 
scenarios. For the baseline results (see Appendix B), inter-provincial exports occur from 
the Atlantic region to both the Central and Western Canadian regions. Estimated trade 
flows from the Atlantic to the Central region were approximately twice the volume sold 
on the local market in the Atlantic, while only a small amount of seed potatoes flow from 
Atlantic to Western Canada. Baseline results show that Atlantic Canada exports the 
largest volume to the ROW, and that Western Canada is the largest exporter to the U.S.   10
The baseline results are consistent with the average price and quantities, from 1997 to 
2001.     
  Estimated market impacts for both the high and low cost estimates show negative 
impacts on market quantity and positive effects on seed potato price.  For the low cost 
estimate of $0.04/cwt, the market effects are in general small, reflecting the small 
increase in traceability cost. Results for this scenario show that a $0.04/cwt increase in 
T&P cost will result in a decrease in quantity supplied of 0.17% in Atlantic Canada, 
0.13% in Central Canada, and 0.16% in Western Canada. A comparison of the supply 
impacts show that 90% of the losses in quantity supplied occur in Western and Atlantic 
Canada. Results further show that the $0.04/cwt increase in T&P cost will cause a 
decrease in quantity demanded of 0.08% in Atlantic Canada, 0.09% in Central Canada, 
and 0.07% in Western Canada. In addition, the impacts on Canadian seed potato demand 
are evenly distributed across regions. Results for the low cost scenario also show an 
increase in seed potato price of $0.03/cwt for all regions. 
  As expected, the model results show that domestic and international trade is 
negatively affected by additional T&P cost. For the low cost scenario the results show a 
decrease in exports from the Atlantic to Central Canada of 0.01%, and a decrease in 
Exports to Western Canada of 77.8%. Although most of the exports to the Western region 
are lost, exports to this region represent a relatively small amount of output from the 
Atlantic region. For U.S. exports, results show that a $0.04/cwt increase in T&P will 
reduce exports from Atlantic Canada by 0.47%, reduce exports from Central Canada by 
0.35%, and reduce exports from Western Canada by 0.36%. However, in term of export 
volume almost all of the losses in U.S. exports occur for Western and Atlantic Canada.   11
For ROW exports, results from the low cost scenario show that the increase in T&P will 
reduce exports from Atlantic Canada by 0.2%, reduce exports from Central Canada by 
0.33%, and reduce exports from Western Canada by 0.21%. The losses in export volume 
to the ROW are notably larger for Atlantic Canada.  
  In general, the market impacts resulting from the high cost scenario of $0.76/cwt 
are substantially larger in magnitude than the low cost scenario. Results for this scenario 
show that a $0.76/cwt increase in T&P cost will cause a decrease in quantity supplied of 
3% for Atlantic Canada, 2.3% for Central Canada, and 3.2% for Western Canada. Similar 
to the low cost scenario, the supply impacts mostly occur for Western and Atlantic 
Canada. Results further show that the $0.76/cwt increase in T&P will cause a decrease in 
quantity demanded of approximately 1.7% for both Atlantic and Central Canada, and 
1.2% in Western Canada. In addition, results for the low cost scenario show an increase 
in seed potato price of $0.53/cwt for Atlantic and Central Canada, and an increase in 
price of $0.49/cwt for Western Canada. 
  For the high cost scenario the results show that an increase in T&P cost of 
$0.76/cwt will decrease exports from Atlantic to Central Canada by 0.77%, and exports 
from the Atlantic to Western Canada will not occur. For U.S. exports, the high cost 
scenario results show that the increase in T&P will reduce exports from the Atlantic by 
9.2%, reduce exports from Central Canada by 6.9%, and reduce exports from Western 
Canada by 6.5%. However, in term of export volume almost all of the losses in U.S. 
exports occur for Western and Atlantic Canada. For ROW exports, results for the high 
cost scenario show that the increase in T&P cost will reduce exports from the Atlantic by 
4%, reduce exports from Central Canada by 6.6%, and reduce exports from Western   12
Canada by 3.9%. Similar to the low cost scenario, the losses in export volume to the 
ROW are notably larger for Atlantic Canada.  
  Results for the non-compliance scenario (no U.S. seed potato trade) show varying 
market effects across Canadian regions in terms of magnitude and direction. Results for 
this scenario show that non-compliance will cause a decrease in quantity supplied of 
11.7% in Atlantic Canada, 9% in Central Canada, and 34% in Western Canada. The 
market impact results therefore show that non-compliance will have the greatest effect in 
Western Canada. Results further show that non-compliance will cause an increase in 
quantity demanded of 2.7% in Atlantic Canada, 2.8% in Central Canada, and 7% in 
Western Canada. The market price for seed potatoes will decrease by $0.88/cwt in the 
Atlantic and Central Canada, and $2.78/cwt in Western Canada. These results therefore 
show that table stock and processing potato producers will benefit by the loss of the U.S. 
market for seed potato. 
  For the non-compliance scenario the results show that the loss in the U.S. market 
will greatly increase exports from Atlantic to Central Canada. Based on the results, 
exports to Central Canada will increase 23.3%.  For ROW exports, results show that the 
U.S. ban will increase exports from the Atlantic by 6.6%, increase exports from Central 
Canada by 10.8%, and increase exports from Western Canada by 21.9%. In terms of 
volume, the increase in exports to the ROW is notably larger for Atlantic Canada.   13
Table 2. Estimated changes in trade flows resulting from increased tracing and packaging costs (millions of lbs.)    
  Traceability and Packaging Cost     
 $0.04/cwt $0.37/cwt $0.76/cwt  No U.S. Trade 
Market Impact  Total Change %  Total Change  %  Total Change %  Total Change % 
Atlantic  Canada            
Quantity  Supplied  -0.91  -0.17  -7.79  -1.46 -16.02 -3.00 -62.57  -11.72 
Quantity Demanded  -0.29  -0.08  -2.73  -0.80  -5.66  -1.66  9.32  2.74 
U.S. Exports  -0.42  -0.47  -3.98  -4.43  -8.26  -9.20  -89.81  -100.00 
ROW Exports  -0.07  -0.20  -0.69  -1.92  -1.42  -3.97  2.34  6.55 
Central Canada Exports  -0.01  -0.01  -0.24  -0.35  -0.52  -0.77  15.73  23.34 
Western Canada Exports  -0.12  -77.79  -0.15  -100.00  -0.15  -100.00  -0.15  -100.00 
Market Price ($/cwt)  0.03  0.27  0.26  2.55  0.53  5.30  -0.88  -8.73 
            
Central  Canada            
Quantity Supplied  -0.17  -0.13  -1.48  -1.11  -3.05  -2.29  -11.90  -8.96 
Quantity Demanded  -0.17  -0.09  -1.65  -0.83  -3.42  -1.73  5.63  2.84 
U.S.  Exports  -0.01 -0.35  -0.06  -3.34 -0.13 -6.93 -1.83  -100.00 
ROW Exports  -0.001  -0.33  -0.01  -3.16  -0.02  -6.55  0.03  10.79 
Market Price  0.03  0.22  0.26  2.07  0.53  4.29  -0.88  -7.06 
            
Western  Canada            
Quantity Supplied  -0.74  -0.16  -7.40  -1.56  -15.42  -3.25  -160.70  -33.89 
Quantity Demanded  -0.20  -0.07  -1.75  -0.61  -3.61  -1.25  20.36  7.07 
U.S. Exports  -0.65  -0.36  -5.72  -3.14  -11.80  -6.48  -182.16  -100.00 
ROW Exports  -0.01  -0.21  -0.08  -1.88  -0.17  -3.88  0.94  21.92 
Market Price  0.03  0.24  0.24  2.12  0.49  4.37  -2.78  -24.66 
Notes: cwt = hundredweight (100 lbs, = 45.45 kg). Baseline model prices and quantities are an average of crop years 1997 to 2001.  
   14
 
Welfare Impacts 
In order to accurately reflect the economic impacts of the various trade scenarios, 
welfare measure were calculated based on the trade model results. Welfare measures 
include changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus, and total welfare resulting from 
the three T&P cost estimates, and from a ban on U.S. trade. The welfare changes are 
relative to the baseline situation of no additional traceability requirements for Canadian 
producers. These economic measures are presented in Table 3 for the three Canadian 
regions, as well as for the U.S. and the ROW. For the U.S. and the ROW, the social 
welfare measure represents the gains from trade with all of Canada.  
  For the low cost estimate of $0.04/cwt, the welfare effects are generally small, 
reflecting the small increase in traceability cost. Results for this scenario show that a 
$0.04/cwt increase in T&P cost will decrease both producer and consumer surplus in 
Canada. In general the results show that losses in consumer surplus will be slightly larger 
in magnitude than producer surplus. The $0.04/cwt increase in T&P will result in a 
decrease in social welfare of 0.21% in Atlantic Canada, 0.19% in Central Canada, and 
0.18% in Western Canada. In terms of value, the welfare losses in Western and Atlantic 
Canada are twice that of Central Canada.  
  Results from the low cost scenario show the added T&P cost will decrease 
Canadian social welfare by $370,000 or 0.2%.  Compared to the no U.S. trade results, the 
estimated impacts of the low T&P cost on the seed potato market welfare justify 
preservation of trade in seed potato with the U.S. This figure is approximately one-tenth 
of the $3.4 million Canada would lose if imports of seed potatoes into the U.S. were 
banned due to non-compliance. In addition, the distribution of losses across Canadian   15
regions is fairly even, which may improve the acceptability of this scenario at the 
provincial level. Furthermore, the U.S. reduction in social welfare is relatively small, 
indicating that this scenario is economically feasible and thus a credible U.S. policy 
scenario. 
  The magnitude of welfare losses from the high cost T&P system are much higher 
than the low cost system. Similar to the low cost scenario, results for the high cost 
estimate of $0.76/cwt show that the increase in T&P cost will decrease both producer and 
consumer surplus in all Canadian regions. In general, the results show that losses in 
consumer will be larger in magnitude than the loss in producer surplus. In particular, the 
loss in consumer surplus in Central Canada is over three times larger than the loss in 
producer surplus. The $0.76/cwt increase in T&P will cause a decrease in social welfare 
of 4% in Atlantic Canada, 3.6% in Central Canada, and 3.5% in Western Canada. Similar 
to the low cost scenario, the loss in welfare in Central Canada is approximately half of 
the loss occurring in both Western and Atlantic Canada. 
The traceability cost of $0.76/cwt is estimated to decrease Canadian social 
welfare by $7 million or 3.7% from the baseline scenario.  Compared to the no U.S. trade 
results, the estimated impacts of the high T&P cost on the seed potato market welfare do 
not justify preservation of trade in seed potato with the U.S. The $3.4 million Canada 
would lose if imports of seed potatoes into the U.S. were banned due to non-compliance 
is half of the amount lost if the high cost tractability system was in place. This finding 
suggests that Canada should consider non-compliance to potential U.S. POOL regulations 
if the traceability costs are equal to or above the high cost estimate, but compliance may 
be the best option so long as compliance costs are low. Using total Canadian social   16
welfare impacts as the sole criteria, it is estimated that $0.37/cwt is the maximum 
additional traceability cost that farmers should be willing to pay in order to preserve the 
U.S. market. This estimate indicates that the costs of electronically based tracing systems 
need to be reduced in half before compliance to additional trade standards become 
economically feasible. 
  The conclusion that compliance may not be in the best interest to Canada under 
high compliance costs should be tempered by regional distributional considerations. The 
economic consequence from non-compliance varies greatly across Canadian regions. 
Proportionally large decreases in producer surplus will occur if there is a U.S. trade ban. 
Producer surplus will decrease in Atlantic Canada by 22.1%, decrease in Central Canada 
by 17.1%, and decrease in Western Canada by 56.3%. However, due to increases in 
consumer surplus the welfare losses will be largely mitigated.  In Atlantic Canada, results 
show that non-compliance will decrease social welfare in the Atlantic by 1.8% and in 
Western Canada by 3.5%. In Central Canada the rise in consumer surplus is greater than 
the decline in producer surplus, generating an increase in social welfare for the region of 
1.8%. The results therefore show that the U.S. trade ban will have significant 
distributional effects. Unless effective methods can be enacted whereby gainers 
compensate losers, it is likely that the overall small change in welfare caused by non-
compliance may not be evenly distributed across regions within Canada.  Given the 
overall economic losses in Western Canada and Atlantic Canada, along with the gains in 
Central Canada, a non-compliance policy may not be feasible because of distributional 
considerations.   
   17
Table 3. Estimated Welfare Impacts of Increased Tracing and Packaging Costs (Millions of Canadian Dollars)  
   Traceability and Packaging Cost       
 $0.04/cwt $0.37/cwt $0.76/cwt  No U.S. Trade 
Welfare Change   Total Change  %  Total Change %  Total Change %  Total Change % 
Atlantic  Canada          
Consumer Surplus  -0.09  -0.17  -0.87  -1.59  -1.81  -3.29  3.04  5.55 
Producer  Surplus -0.07 -0.34 -0.58 -2.89 -1.19 -5.91 -4.43  -22.06 
Social  Welfare  -0.16 -0.21 -1.46 -1.94 -2.99 -3.99 -1.38 -1.85 
          
Central  Canada          
Consumer Surplus  -0.05  -0.18  -0.51  -1.66  -1.05  -3.42  1.77  5.77 
Producer  Surplus -0.02 -0.26 -0.14 -2.22 -0.30 -4.53 -1.12  -17.11 
Social Welfare  -0.07  -0.19  -0.65  -1.75  -1.35  -3.62  0.65  1.75 
          
Western Canada                  
Consumer Surplus  -0.08  -0.14  -0.69  -1.21  -1.41  -2.49  8.29  14.65 
Producer Surplus  -0.06  -0.31  -0.60  -3.10  -1.25  -6.40  -10.96  -56.30 
Social  Welfare  -0.14 -0.18 -1.29 -1.69 -2.66 -3.49 -2.66 -3.50 
          
Total  Canada          
Consumer Surplus  -0.22  -0.16  -2.07  -1.46  -4.27  -3.00  13.10  9.22 
Producer Surplus  -0.15  -0.32  -1.33  -2.88  -2.73  -5.92  -16.50  -35.83 
Social  Welfare  -0.37 -0.20 -3.40 -1.80 -6.99 -3.72 -3.40 -1.80 
          
U.S.          
Social  Welfare  -0.07  -0.77  -0.66 -6.86 -1.34 -13.91 -9.61  -100.00
          
ROW          
Social Welfare  -0.01  -0.41  -0.10  -3.80  -0.21  -7.80  0.46  17.13 
Notes: cwt = hundredweight (100 lbs, = 45.45 kgs) . Baseline model prices and quantities are an average of crop years 1997 to 2001.  All figures are 
expressed in millions of $CDN.   18
The results for the non-compliance scenario also show that the value of trade with 
the ROW does not increase substantially an enough in the non-compliance case to offset 
the loss of the U.S. market. The findings highlight that the U.S. is by far the largest 
international market for Canadian seed potatoes, and an important market for producers 
in Western Canada. Finally, it is estimated that a ban on seed potatoes entering the U.S. 
would result in a net loss to the U.S. of $9.61 million. This loss is incurred by U.S. non-
seed potato producers who will no longer be able to buy high quality Canadian seed 
potatoes. Furthermore, the losses to the U.S. producers are approximately threefold the 
losses incurred by Canadian producers. It may not be in the U.S. potato producers’ 
interest to force compliance on Canadian seed potato producers; and hence the U.S. 
position may not be credible. However, the interests of U.S. potato producers may be 
outweighed by those of U.S. seed potato producers who would gain as a result of an 
import ban.  
 
5.   Conclusions  
Bilateral agreements and RTAs with the U.S. and neighbouring countries provide 
the greatest potential in meeting the trade interests of Canadian producers, however, even 
with more integrated markets, exports of Canadian agricultural products to the U.S. are 
always threatened by protectionist interests. Recent trade concerns have led in part to the 
increased demand by the U.S. for country of origin labelling and increased health and 
safety testing on food and other raw materials entering the country. Policy decisions over 
compliance to U.S. trade requirements should be considerate of the costs and benefits   19
associated with compliance to additional U.S. trade restrictions, because of potential 
impacts on domestic trade within Canada.  
For Canadian seed potatoes, the increased costs of compliance with the U.S. 
requirements will impose additional tracing and packaging costs on seed potato producers 
in Canada, which will not only affect bilateral trade with the U.S. but also domestic trade 
within Canada. The purpose of this study was to address these issues within the Canadian 
seed potato market. The results indicate that it may not be in Canada’s interest to comply 
with increased import requirements suggested by the U.S..   Increased import 
requirements will affect both domestic as well as international trade.  The loss of 
domestic production and trade resulting from the increased requirements is twice the loss 
that would result if this market were abandoned due to non-compliance.  It may be in 
Canada’s interests to abandon the U.S. market in order to preserve domestic trade.  
Furthermore, the results indicate that the U.S. may suffer from a ban on imports at least 
as much as Canada, so that the U.S. position may not be a credible threat.  Canada 
produces a high quality seed potato that is not easily produced elsewhere.  U.S. potato 
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Appendix A 
 
This section provides details on elasticity estimates used to construction the 
partial equilibrium trade model. A review of the literature revealed no suitable elasticity 
estimates for seed potato supply or demand. Therefore, this research required that 
estimation of supply and demand elasticities for seed potato supply, demand and import 
demand. Elasticity estimates for the PEI seed potato sector were previously calculated by 
the authors using ordinary least squares. These estimates were used as proxies for other 
regions were applicable.  Given that technologies used in seed potato production across 
Canada do not differ substantially, supply and factor demand elasticity estimates are 
likely similar. The elasticity for world import demand is also likely to be close to the U.S. 
import demand.  
Data collection for the estimation process revealed limitations in the quantity and 
quality of seed potato data in Canada. These limitations forced the use of unit values for 
quantity variables and for the price for seed potato exports. Limited observations for seed 
potato data would have resulted in a degrees of freedom problem if all variables were 
included in the econometric models. Thus, several specifications were explored, and the 
variables deemed most significant were included in the final models. Despite these issues, 
all parameter estimates on seed potato price were statistically significant.  
All models were estimated in log-linear form. Variable definitions are presented 
in table A.1, regression results for seed potato supply are presented in table A.2, result for 
seed potato demand are presented in table A.3, and import demand results are presented 
in table A.4. Given the estimation in logarithmic form the parameter estimates for 
demand and import demand are elasticities. The supply elasticity is calculated using   23
Nerlove’s partial adjustment principle (Greene, 2000). This yields a long-run supply 
elasticity of 0.5232/(1-0.6003) = 1.309. 
 




t  Seed potato price index 
P
l
t  farm labour price index 
P
b
t  farm building and fencing price index 
P
m
t  farm machinery and motor vehicle price index 
P
f
t  Fertilizer price index 
P
p
t  Pesticide price index 
D
pw     Potato Wart dummy variable (crop years 1999-2000 and 2001-2003)  
D
pvyn  PvYn dummy variable (crop year 1992-1993)  
P
x
t   average price of seed potato exports ($/cwt) 




Table A.2 Regression results for seed potato demand in PEI 
Variable Parameter  Estimate  t-value 
Constant 14.73  *  283.6 
P
s
t  -0.40 -2.37 
P
l
t -3.91  *  -3.25 
P
b
t 2.21  *  2.72 
P
m
t 1.64  1.84 
Time trend  -0.02  -1.76 
D
pw -0.13  -2.11 
    
Model Statistics:     
SSE 0.05   
R2 0.82   
d.f. 8   
F-stat 6.04   
* Significant at 5% level   
Note: dependent variable is quantity of seed potatoes; model was estimated for the 
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Table A.3 Regression results for seed potato supply in PEI 
Variable Parameter  Estimate  t-value 
Constant 0.62  *  4.30 
Qt-1 0.60  *  4.32 
P
s
t-1 0.52  *  5.42 
P
f
t-1 1.44  *  4.15 
P
p
t-1 1.94  *  2.95 
P
m
t-1 -1.52  *  -1.98 
Time trend  -0.01  -0.97 
    
Model Statistics:     
SSE 0.02   
R2 0.90   
d.f. 7   
F-stat 10.78   
* Significant at 5% level   
Note: dependent variable is quantity of seed potatoes; model was estimated 






Appendix A.4 Regression results for U.S. seed potato import 
demand for PEI 
Variable Parameter  estimate  t-value 
Constant 18.46  *  8.96 
P
x
t -2.14  *  -2.87 
D
pvyn -5.01  *  -7.28 
Time trend  -0.11 *  -3.43 
    
Model Statistics:     
SSE 5.72   
R2 0.84   
d.f. 14   
F-stat 24.61   
* Significant at 5% level     
Note: dependent variable is quantity of seed potato exports to the U.S.; model was 
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Appendix B 
 
Appendix B.1 Baseline Partial equilibrium model results for 
North American seed potato market 
   Model Result 
Atlantic Canada   
Quantity Supplied  5339567 
Quantity Demanded  3408024 
U.S. Exports  898131.9 
ROW Exports  357652.6 
Central Canada Exports  674212.7 
Western Canada Exports  1545.989 
Market Price ($/cwt)  10.0836 
  
Central Canada   
Quantity Supplied  1328733 
Quantity Demanded  1981410 
U.S. Exports  18335.98 
ROW Exports  3199.65 
Atlantic Canada Exports  0 
Western Canada Exports  0 
Market Price ($/cwt)  12.4736 
  
Western Canada   
Quantity Supplied  4741258 
Quantity Demanded  2878243 
U.S. Exports  1821562 
ROW Exports  42999.27 
Atlantic Canada Exports  0 
Central Canada Exports  0 
Market Price ($/cwt)  11.2836 
Note: All quantities hundred weight (cwt) 
 